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DEFERENCE CONDONING APATHY: SOCIAL 
VISIBILITY IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
Adriana Heffley* 
INTRODUCTION 
Lola Mendez De Vasquez, a Salvadoran single mother of two girls, 
realized that gang members (Maras) in El Salvador were attempting 
to recruit her daughters.1 The Maras demanded that Lola allow her 
eldest daughter, Heidy, to join the gang. After Lola refused, the 
Maras threatened to kill her family.”2 One day, during Heidy’s walk 
home from school, two Maras raped her.3 Knowing the Maras would 
kill her and her family if she said anything, Heidy did not report the 
rape.”4 El Salvador, which has one of the highest homicide rates 
worldwide, has a highly evolved gang warfare system in which “rape 
is used as a weapon” to terrorize the community.5 Heidy’s cousin, 
                                                                                                                 
 *  J.D. Candidate, 2019, Georgia State University College of Law. My deepest gratitude goes to my 
family for their love, support, and patience over the past four years. Thank you to Professor Carolina 
Antonini for your guidance during the process of writing this Note and your enthusiastic encouragement 
of students’ involvement in pro bono work. I am immensely grateful to my Law Review colleagues for 
their hard work editing and publishing this Note. 
 1. Vasquez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 345 F. App’x 441, 443–44 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. If Heidy had become pregnant from this rape, she would have been legally unable to 
terminate the pregnancy. AMNESTY INT’L, ON THE BRINK OF DEATH: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND 
THE ABORTION BAN IN EL SALVADOR 7 (2014). 
In 1997, El Salvador’s Legislative Assembly passed into law the prohibition of all forms 
of abortion, making it a criminal offen[s]e for a woman to have an abortion[] or for 
anyone to assist her in procuring or carrying out an abortion. Women found guilty of 
terminating their pregnancies may be sentenced to long jail terms. Conviction is often 
based on weak or inconclusive evidence, following flawed trials. This prohibition denies 
access to safe and legal abortions for women and girls who are pregnant as a result of 
rape or whose pregnancy endangers their life and health. 
Id. 
 4. Vasquez, 345 F. App’x at 443. 
 5. Alberto Arce, El Salvador’s Gangs Target Women and Girls, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Nov. 5, 
2014, 10:36 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-el-salvadors-gangs-target-women-and-
girls-2014nov05-story.html [https://perma.cc/7DC4-DHVZ] (describing how gang members are 
initiated through rape to prove their worth and ensure silence regarding crimes and explaining how 
women raised in the society see rape so frequently that many do not recognize it as a crime); see also 
Angelika Albaladejo, How Violence Affects Women in El Salvador, LATIN AM. WORKING GROUP (Feb. 
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Yessenia, also endured threats from the Maras to join their gang on 
multiple occasions.6 Eventually, the Maras threatened Yessenia at 
knife-point, promising to rape her or kill her family if she did not join 
them.7 Yessenia explicitly rebuffed the Maras, countering that “they 
did bad things” and that “they were going to hell.”8 
Seeking refuge, the women entered the United States without 
inspection in 2005.9 After receiving notices to appear before a 
Florida immigration judge for removal proceedings, the women 
applied for asylum.10 To succeed in their claims, the women would 
have to prove that their experiences at the hands of the Maras 
amounted to persecution (or alternatively, that they possessed a well-
founded fear of future persecution) on account of race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social 
group (“Particular Social Group”), rendering them unable or 
                                                                                                                 
22, 2016), http://www.lawg.org/action-center/lawg-blog/69-general/1590-how-violence-affects-women-
in-el-salvador/ [https://perma.cc/E4T8-VPGJ]. 
Gangs rape and violently murder young girls, or claim them as “novias de las 
pandillas”—”girlfriends” of the gangs. “Women’s bodies were treated like territory 
during the civil war and continue to be today by the gangs,” says Jeanette Urquilla, the 
director of the Organization of Salvadoran Women for Peace (ORMUSA). In many gang-
controlled neighborhoods, young girls expect they will be raped, abducted, and/or 
murdered by the gangs. 
Id. 
The United States government is not blameless in this conflict—as in much of Central America during 
the 1980s, the United States sent El Salvador “military advisers” and “hundreds of millions of dollars in 
economic and military aid,” intensifying a civil war that claimed 75,000 lives. Raymond Bonner, Time 
for a US Apology to El Salvador, NATION (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/time-for-
a-us-apology-to-el-salvador [https://perma.cc/AB6F-WNND]. In December 1981, a single operation 
carried out by the “Atlacatl Battalion, which had just completed a three-month counterinsurgency 
training course in the United States,” killed 1,200 people. Raymond Bonner, America’s Role in El 
Salvador’s Deterioration, ATLANTIC (Jan. 20, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/01/trump-and-el-salvador/550955/ 
[https://perma.cc/F78H-QWR8]. 
 6. Vasquez, 345 F. App’x at 443. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. Heidy also stated that she “believed in God and did not want to do such things.” Id. 
 9. Id. Many immigrants who enter without inspection do not know that they should present to 
Customs Officers at ports of entry to apply for asylum; others are increasingly turned away “illegally” 
by border agents claiming that the government is not “accepting” asylum applications. See Ana 
Adlerstein, Asylum Seekers Routinely Turned Away from Ports of Entry, Advocates Say, GUARDIAN 
(Dec. 19, 2018, 7:53 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/dec/19/us-mexico-border-
migrants-claim-asylum-difficulties [https://perma.cc/53FC-CSKW]. 
 10. Vasquez, 345 F. App’x at 443. 
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unwilling to return to El Salvador.11 As asylum seekers applying in 
the southeastern United States, the women faced odds of success 
varying wildly from approximately 2%–75%, depending on the 
immigration judge.12 Had the women applied in Atlanta, Georgia, 
they would have faced a 98% chance of failure.13 Of the three 
women, only Heidy was found to have suffered persecution.14 
However, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that Heidy, who sought 
asylum under the proposed Particular Social Group of “young 
Salvadorian [sic] students who expressly oppose gang practices and 
values and . . . wish to protect their family members against such 
practices,” failed to establish membership in a “cognizable” 
Particular Social Group.15 Approving the application of two 
relatively new criteria, “particularity” and “social visibility,” the 
Eleventh Circuit found that Heidy was ineligible for asylum because 
no evidence indicated that the Maras “limited” their recruitment to 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Establishing Asylum Eligibility, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2018). Establishing past persecution 
gives rise to a presumption that the applicant also possesses a well-founded fear of persecution. Id. 
Further, if applicants can establish only that they possess a fear of future persecution, not a history of 
past persecution, they must prove that simply relocating to a different place within their country of 
origin would not eliminate the danger. Id. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(B). Additionally, applicants may need to 
defend against government arguments that conditions in their countries of origin have changed since 
their departure such that the applicant no longer possesses a well-founded fear of persecution. Id. 
§ 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A). Asylum-seekers must also take care to avoid any perception that they firmly 
resettled in a third country before entering the United States (for example, receiving asylum in a third 
country before seeking asylum in the United States could constitute firm resettlement). 
Id. § 208.13(c)(2)(B). Once an asylum-seeker fulfills all the statutory requirements, she still must 
receive a favorable exercise of discretion by the immigration judge. Id. § 208.13(b)(1)(i). Persons with 
certain criminal histories, including persecution of others, serious nonpolitical crimes, and terrorism, are 
barred from receiving asylum. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c) (detailing grounds for asylum-seeker inadmissibility 
under the Immigration and Naturalization Act §§ 208(a)(2) and 208(b)(2)). 
 12. Judge-by-Judge Asylum Decisions in Immigration Courts Before and After the Attorney 
General’s Directive, TRAC IMMIGR., http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/240/include/denialrates.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/54V2-AMUS] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017). Of the courts in the southeastern United 
States feeding into the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Miami’s immigration judges produce the 
highest asylum grant rates. Id. 
 13. OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE EXEC. OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2016 STATISTICS YEARBOOK, at K2 (2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/fysb16/download [https://perma.cc/RM5E-V9E9]. 
 14. Vasquez, 345 F. App’x at 443. 
 15. Id. at 446. 
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students in Heidy’s position and because students in Heidy’s position 
were not “generally . . . recognizable by others in the community.”16 
The criteria used to deny Heidy’s asylum application, particularity 
and social visibility, were not originally part of the Particular Social 
Group inquiry.17 Social visibility, which requires asylum-seekers to 
prove that they were perceived as part of a “group” by society at 
large in their countries of origin, was not referenced as a requirement 
to forming a Particular Social Group in the Eleventh Circuit until 
2006.18 Before the early 2000s, the circuit courts generally agreed 
that establishing persecution on account of membership in a 
Particular Social Group mirrored the requirement for establishing 
persecution based on race, religion, nationality, or political opinion.19 
This consensus recognized that each ground “describes persecution 
aimed at an immutable characteristic: a 
characteristic . . . either . . . beyond the power of an individual to 
change or . . . so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that 
it ought not be required to be changed.”20 The social-visibility 
requirement, which gained acceptance in the circuit courts beginning 
in 2006 to 2008, has been roundly criticized as irreconcilable with the 
pre-2000 line of accepted case law by commentators, international 
organizations, and some circuit courts.21 In their zeal to ensure that 
Particular Social Groups do not function as “catch-alls” for 
individuals who cannot neatly tie their persecution to their race, 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Id. The particularity requirement seeks to combat what courts viewed as overly broad, 
amorphously defined Particular Social Groups. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584–85 (B.I.A. 2008). 
Under this requirement, asylum applicants must concretely define the boundaries of their Particular 
Social Group. Id. at 585. Particular Social Groups defined too broadly or “inchoate” (for example, 
young women in Brazil) will fail the particularity inquiry and result in asylum application denials. Id. at 
586. 
 17. Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining a “Particular 
Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 
27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 48 (2008). 
 18. Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1194 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 19. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. 
Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Nitzan Sternberg, Do I Need To Pin a Target to My Back?: The Definition of “Particular Social 
Group” in U.S. Asylum Law, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 245, 295–96 (2011). 
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religion, nationality, or political opinion, the courts have levied a 
requirement that results in vastly different outcomes for similar case 
facts and denials of claims that would have fulfilled the requirements 
for asylum before 2006.22 United States circuit courts’ continued 
rubber-stamping of lower courts’ applications of the social-visibility 
criterion has strangled asylum grant rates and emboldened callous 
treatment toward asylum-seekers in immigration courts like Atlanta, 
where immigration judges have been observed belittling applicants 
and conducting proceedings without interpreters.23 Were Lola, 
Yessenia, and Heidy to apply for asylum in Atlanta today, not only 
would they face a one-in-fifty chance of success but they would 
relive their trauma before judges noted for “appearing wholly 
disinterested” in asylum applicants’ testimonies and only becoming 
alert when “scold[ing] an attorney or a respondent.”24 
This Note examines the history of the social-visibility requirement 
for Particular Social Groups in Eleventh Circuit asylum claims and 
the adjudication disparities that have resulted from its imposition in 
the southeastern United States. Part I of this Note introduces the 
asylum application process, examines the historical treatment of 
Particular Social Groups nationally, and traces the recent restrictions 
on Particular Social Groups within the Eleventh Circuit in 
particular.25 Part II compares the Eleventh Circuit’s treatment of 
Particular Social Groups to treatment in the Third and Seventh 
Circuits and considers how previously successful claims for asylum 
would fare under the current state of the law in the Eleventh 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Id. at 295. 
 23. Letter from Hallie Ludsin, Professor, Emory Law Sch., to Juan P. Osuna, Dir., Exec. Office for 
Immigration Review (Mar. 2, 2017), available at https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/2017-
atl_complaint_letter_final.pdf. 
 24. Id.; see also OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & STATISTICS, supra note 13.This grant rate has a 
chilling effect on immigration attorneys’ willingness to accept asylum cases and access to pro or low-
bono asylum assistance in Atlanta. Ted Hesson, Why It’s Almost Impossible To Get Asylum in Atlanta, 
VICE (Jun. 8, 2016), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/bn38x5/why-its-almost-impossible-to-get-
asylum-in-atlanta [https://perma.cc/4YRZ-4UCS]. According to Professor Shana Tabak, although 
attorneys outside Atlanta can generally expect relief if they enter court “with good preparation and a 
meritorious case,” in Atlanta, “attorneys don’t seem to have that feeling when they go into a 
courtroom.” Id. 
 25. See infra Part I. 
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Circuit.26 Last, Part III proposes that the Eleventh Circuit adopt a 
standard suggested by a prominent source of United States asylum 
law to evaluate Particular Social Groups and weighs the effects of 
this standard.27 
I.   Background 
A.    Origins of United States Asylum Law 
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“1951 
Convention”)—the “only global legal instrument dealing with the 
status and rights of refugees”—originally set forth the modern 
definition of “refugee” and defined “the kind of legal protection, 
other assistance, and social rights” that governments should provide 
to refugees.28 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(“UNHCR”) serves as the “guardian” of the 1951 Convention and 
subsequent 1967 Protocol.29 In 1980, the United States codified its 
international treaty obligations with the Refugee Act of 1980, 
declaring, “[I]t is the historic policy of the United States to respond 
to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in their 
homelands,” and promising to “encourage all nations to provide 
assistance and resettlement opportunities to refugees to the fullest 
extent possible.”30 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See infra Part II. 
 27. See infra Part III. 
 28. U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(A)(2), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 
150; UNHCR, THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 
PROTOCOL 5 (Sept. 2011) [hereinafter THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 
AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL]. Under the Convention, a person is a refugee if he, “[a]s a result of events 
occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well[-]founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group[,] or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to 
it.” U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(A)(2), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. 
 29. THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL, 
supra note 28, at 4. The 1967 Protocol “broaden[ed]” the 1951 Convention by eliminating its original 
“geographical and time limits”; for example, the limitation of refugees to people affected by events that 
occurred before January 1, 1951. Id. 
 30. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101(a), 94 Stat. 102, 102. Numerous subsequent 
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B.   Applying for Asylum 
1.   Elements of Successful Asylum Claims 
To establish eligibility for asylum, applicants must prove that they 
are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin because of 
past persecution (or a “well-founded fear” of future persecution) “on 
account of” race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or 
membership in a Particular Social Group.31 
The elements of an asylum case are not statutorily defined; they 
have evolved through case law over the last several decades.32 
Persecution “requires more than a few isolated incidents of verbal 
harassment or intimidation, unaccompanied by any physical 
punishment, infliction of harm, or significant deprivation of 
liberty.”33 Applicants need to prove that one of the grounds was “at 
                                                                                                                 
statutes have modified immigration law; notable among these is 1996’s Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IRIRA”). See generally Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546. IRIRA added a requirement that 
asylum seekers demonstrate “by clear and convincing evidence” that they filed their asylum applications 
within one year of arriving within the United States, although some exceptional circumstances (for 
example, extreme medical conditions like comas or post-traumatic stress disorder) can allow asylum 
seekers to circumvent the requirement. Id. § 604(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-691 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (1998)). 
 31. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2018). Successfully proving past persecution accords applicants the 
“presumption” of a well-founded fear of future persecution. Id. However, an asylum officer or 
immigration judge can rebut this presumption by determining that “a fundamental change in 
circumstances” occurred “such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution” in 
his home country or that “the applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of” 
his home country. Id. 
 32. Martine Forneret, Pulling the Trigger: An Analysis of Circuit Court Review of the “Persecutor 
Bar,” 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1007, 1039 (2013). 
 33. Mikhailevitch v. INS., 146 F.3d 384, 390 (6th Cir. 1998). Further, applicants must prove that the 
persecution suffered entailed both objective and subjective components. See Saleh v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 962 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1992) (“The applicant must show he has a subjective fear of 
persecution[] and that the fear is grounded in objective facts.”). Asylum seekers typically cannot 
establish that “prosecution for criminal violations of fairly administered laws” entails persecution. 
Janusiak v. INS, 947 F.2d 46, 48 (3d Cir. 1991). But see Dwomoh v. Sava, 696 F. Supp. 970, 972–79 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (ruling that a former Ghanaian soldier who, “disturbed by worsening political 
conditions (including summary execution of eight generals and several judges, among others),” 
committed to “participate in resistance activities” involving “free[ing] his friend from prison 
and . . . support[ing] a coup against the military government” did suffer persecution by the government 
because the Ghanaian government provided no due process protections, may have punished the 
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least one central reason” for the claimed persecution.34 The phrase 
“on account of” requires that the persecution be “causally linked” to 
one of the statutory grounds.35 Among the five grounds (race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a Particular 
Social Group), Particular Social Groups—the most amorphous, 
politically vulnerable ground—generates the most confusion and 
debate.36 
2.   Procedure 
Applicants can seek asylum affirmatively within one year of 
arrival in the United States (subject to certain exceptions) or 
defensively after being placed in removal (deportation) 
proceedings.37 Affirmative asylum seekers attend nonadversarial 
                                                                                                                 
applicant “arbitrarily,” and given the political conditions in Ghana, “a coup [may have been] the only 
means by which political change [could have been] effected.”). 
 34. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–13, § 101, 119 Stat. 231, 303 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2006)). 
 35. Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims: A Unifying 
Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 777, 781 (2003). This requirement, called the 
“nexus” between one of the five protected grounds and the persecution, is often difficult to prove: 
In INS v. Elias-Zacarias, the Court considered the case of a Guatemalan man who was 
seeking asylum based on political opinion. His basic claim was that he was being 
pressured to join a guerrilla group opposed to the government. He feared that if he did 
join, the government would harm him and his family, so he left Guatemala. In an opinion 
by Justice Scalia, the Court upheld the Board of Immigration Appeals’[s] (“BIA”) 
decision denying asylum and reversed the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals, finding that any 
persecution Elias-Zacarias would face could not be proven to be on account of his 
political opinion. Elias-Zacarias failed to demonstrate that he had a political opinion or 
that his opinion was the motivating factor behind his persecution. In short, the Court 
required convincing evidence of the motive of the persecutor, which would (presumably) 
prove that the asylum seeker was being persecuted on account of an enumerated 
ground. Through this decision, the Court effectively shifted the focus from the fear 
experienced by the victim to the thoughts and motives of the persecutor. Thus, a two-part 
test to establish a nexus between persecution and an enumerated ground developed. To 
pass this test, the asylum seeker must (1) establish that she has a race, religion, 
nationality, social group membership, or political opinion, and (2) show that the 
persecutor was motivated by that race, religion, etc. Proving the persecutor’s motive is 
often difficult, if not impossible, and courts have subsequently encountered significant 
difficulties in applying Elias-Zacarias’s holding. 
Brigette L. Frantz, Note, Proving Persecution: The Burdens of Establishing a Nexus in Religious 
Asylum Claims and the Dangers of New Reforms, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 499, 511 (2007). 
 36. Marouf, supra note 17, at 48. 
 37. Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., 
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interviews with asylum officers.38 Defensive asylum seekers and 
affirmative asylum seekers whose applications were denied by an 
asylum officer (and are not present in the country under another legal 
status like a work visa) are issued a notice to appear for a hearing in 
front of an immigration judge.39 
During this adversarial process, the immigration judge hears 
arguments from the applicant and from the United States government 
(represented by an attorney from Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE)).40 Approximately 91% of asylum seekers who 
face this hearing without an attorney are denied asylum.41 If the 
immigration judges exercise their discretion to deny the application, 
the decision can be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”), the United States’s “highest administrative body for 
interpreting and applying immigration laws.”42 Faced with another 
                                                                                                                 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states 
[https://perma.cc/6D2L-8KS6] (last updated Oct. 19, 2015). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. Defensive asylum seekers are typically detained. To secure release from detention, a detained 
asylum seeker must pass a “credible fear” interview. Review of Credible Fear Determination, 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.42 (2018). Taking into account an asylum seeker’s credibility, asylum officers examine 
whether a “significant possibility” exists that the asylum seeker could establish asylum eligibility in a 
full hearing. Id. If a significant possibility exists, the asylum officer may release the asylum seeker on 
bond. Id. 
 40. Obtaining Asylum in the United States, supra note 37. 
 41. Judge Earle B. Wilson, TRAC IMMIGR., 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judgereports/00132ATL/index.html [https://perma.cc/8RT6-
L629] (last visited Sept. 24, 2017). 
 42. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-
immigration-appeals [https://perma.cc/R7AB-CBCF] (last updated Oct. 15, 2018). Even if an 
immigration judge finds an applicant eligible to receive asylum, the judge may exercise discretion to 
deny asylum relief: 
[C]ourts and [immigration judges (IJs)] should consider, when relevant, the following 
non-exhaustive list of factors as part of the totality of the circumstances. On the positive 
side, an IJ should consider: 
1) Family, business, community, and employment ties to the United States, and length of 
residence and property ownership in this country; 
2) Evidence of hardship to the alien and his family if deported to any country, or if denied 
asylum such that the alien cannot be reunited with family members (as derivative asylees) 
in this country; 
3) Evidence of good character, value, or service to the community, including proof of 
genuine rehabilitation if a criminal record is present; 
4) General humanitarian reasons, such as age or health; 
5) Evidence of severe past persecution and/or well-founded fear of future persecution, 
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denial, asylum seekers may seek federal review by a court of appeals. 
These appeals rarely succeed. The Courts of Appeals usually defer to 
the BIA under the doctrine of Chevron deference, which means, that 
the BIA’s conclusions can only be overturned if “any reasonable 
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”43 
Considering the “extreme hardships and difficulties that result” from 
deportation, some commentators have called for more exacting 
review of lower courts’ decisions.44 Chevron deference, which bows 
to the BIA’s judgment in part to promote adjudicative uniformity, has 
precipitated a post-social-visibility drop in the percentage of cases 
                                                                                                                 
including consideration of other relief granted or denied the applicant (e.g., withholding 
of removal or CAT protection). 
On the negative side, relevant factors include the: 
1) Nature and underlying circumstances of the exclusion ground; 
2) Presence of significant violations of immigration laws; 
3) Presence of a criminal record and the nature, recency, and seriousness of that record, 
including evidence of recidivism; 
4) Lack of candor with immigration officials, including an actual adverse credibility 
finding by the IJ; 
5) Other evidence that indicates bad character or undesirability for permanent residence 
in the United States. 
We emphasize that an IJ need not analyze or even list every factor. To the contrary, we 
explicitly reject such an “inflexible test” and recognize the “undesirability and ‘difficulty, 
if not impossibility, of defining any standard in discretionary matters of this 
character.’” But at the very least, an IJ must demonstrate that he or she reviewed the 
record and balanced the relevant factors and must discuss the positive or adverse factors 
that support his or her decision. 
Zuh v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 504, 510–11 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). 
 43. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2018). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently invalidated 
§ 1252(e), but § 1252(b) remains valid. Thursaissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 18-55313, 
2019 WL 1065027 at *5 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2019). Before 1984, courts applied varying, inconsistent 
standards of review to decisions from administrative agencies. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and 
Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2082 (1990). In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., the Supreme Court implemented “a two-step inquiry. The first question 
was whether Congress had explicitly foreclosed the agency’s decision. The second was whether that 
decision was reasonable or permissible.” Id. at 2084. Chevron deference, in combination with the 
“limited scope of judicial review,” began to concentrate the BIA’s power “not only to decide cases but 
also to shape future law. As a result, the proposed centralization of judicial review would alter the extent 
of the concentration of adjudicatory power only marginally.” Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring 
Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1707 (2010). 
 44. Matthew F. Soares, Agencies and Aliens: A Modified Approach to Chevron Deference in 
Immigration Cases, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 925, 944 (2014). Previously a common law concept applied in 
criminal and early immigration cases, the idea of “lenity” pushed courts “to construe ambiguous laws in 
favor of the defendant due to the overwhelming constitutional concerns associated with punishment and 
depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property.” Id. at 933 (emphasis added). 
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reversed or remanded by a court of appeals from 17.5% in 2006 to 
11.3% in 2016.45 
C.   The Thorniest Basis for Asylum: Particular Social Group 
For years, Matter of Acosta offered leading guidance in forming 
cognizable Particular Social Groups; members must possess a 
“common, immutable characteristic” (similar to race, religion, 
nationality, or political opinion) that is “so fundamental to individual 
identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be changed.”46 
Immutable characteristics that may form the basis for a Particular 
Social Group under Matter of Acosta’s formulation include “sex, 
color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances . . . a shared past 
experience such as former military leadership or land ownership.”47 
In adopting this approach to Particular Social Groups, the BIA 
expressed its objective of restricting asylum grants to applicants who 
were either unable or could not be conscientiously required to avoid 
persecution by forsaking past experiences or values central to their 
identities.48 
1.   An Additional Requirement: Social Visibility 
In its 2006 decision, In Re C-A-, the BIA began to include social 
visibility as an additional requirement for Particular Social Groups. 
This change occurred after the UNHCR refined its definition of 
Particular Social Groups, limiting members to “persons who share a 
                                                                                                                 
 45. John Guendelsberger, Circuit Court Decisions for December 2016 and Calendar Year Totals for 
2016, IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR (Exec. Office for Immigration Review, D.C.), Jan. 2017, at 3; Soares, supra 
note 44, at 931. As opposed to cases involving expedited removal orders and those in which 
“noncitizens are removable on crime-related grounds,” which cannot be appealed, asylum cases are 
reviewable and “make up the bulk of the courts’ immigration caseloads.” Legomsky, supra note 43, at 
1643–44. Appeals from BIA decisions flood federal courts, occupying a significant portion of federal 
circuits’ caseloads and resulting in “duplicat[ion]” of the BIA’s decisions, with few cases reaching a 
different result. Id. at 1646. 
 46. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 212 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. 
Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). 
 47. Id. at 233. 
 48. Id. 
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common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or 
who are perceived as a group by society.”49 The same year, in 
Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Attorney General, the Eleventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals suggested that the social-visibility criterion was always a 
part of the Particular Social Group analysis dating back to before 
Matter of Acosta, stating that “the two illustrations provided in 
Acosta, ‘former military leadership and land ownership’—are also 
easily recognizable traits.”50 Ultimately, the court in Castillo-Arias 
found that noncriminal informants working against the Cali drug 
cartel in Colombia were not sufficiently “visible” to form a Particular 
Social Group.51 Because “the very nature of [serving as an informant 
against a drug cartel] prevented the applicant from ‘being recognized 
by society at large,’” he was “not visible enough to be considered a 
member of a ‘particular social group.’”52 
2.   Castillo-Arias’s Legacy in the Eleventh Circuit 
The Eleventh Circuit continued to defer to the BIA’s new criterion 
in 2008, holding that “Honduran schoolboys who conscientiously 
refuse to join gangs” were not sufficiently socially visible.53 In 
Gomez-Benitez v. U.S. Attorney General, the court again warned 
against the use of Particular Social Groups as “a ‘catch-all’ ground 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 2006); UNHCR, 
Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context 
of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 
11, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter Guidelines on International Protection]; see 
also S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 579–87 (B.I.A. 2008) (holding that two Salvadoran teenagers who 
were approached by MS-13 gang members and asked to join the gang, beaten, threatened, and told their 
sister would be raped if they did not join the gang did not belong to a sufficiently socially visible group 
because “Salvadoran youth who are recruited by gangs but refuse to join” are not “‘perceived as a 
group’ by society[]” and do not “suffer from a higher incidence of crime than the rest of the population.” 
Although the court was wary of allowing asylum seekers to define particular social groups by the 
persecution their members experienced, this reasoning seems to require a higher level of persecution and 
focused targeting for a group to be considered a particular social group.). 
 50. Castillo-Arias, 446 F.3d at 1194. 
 51. Id. at 1198. However, countless Particular Social Groups accepted under Matter of Acosta’s 
formula might not be sufficiently “visible” in society’s eyes to form a more visible group than 
noncriminal informants working against a drug cartel. Id. at 1197. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Gomez-Benitez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 295 F. App’x 324, 326 (11th Cir. 2008). 
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for all persons alleging persecution . . . who cannot establish refugee 
status under any of the other recognized grounds.”54 The next year, 
the Eleventh Circuit extended this same reasoning to the proposed 
Particular Social Group of young men who pledged membership to a 
formal group protesting against the MS-13 gang.55 In 2010, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that a dental-prosthetics expert in Colombia 
was not a member of a sufficiently visible Particular Social Group.56 
The same year, professionals unwilling to collaborate and share their 
knowledge and skills with revolutionaries against the Colombian 
government were also denied status as members of a Particular Social 
Group.57 Drawing a parallel to noncriminal informants, the Eleventh 
Circuit held in Jai Lok Ling v. U.S. Attorney General that business 
owners who owe money to loan sharks lack social visibility because 
loan sharks’ crimes “tend to be criminal in nature and are often 
conducted secretly.”58 
Even when an individual is misidentified publicly in a Honduran 
newspaper as a murderer, the Eleventh Circuit will not find that she 
is sufficiently socially visible to be counted as part of a Particular 
Social Group if doing so would run the risk of allowing her to use 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Navas-Villanueva v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 338 F. App’x 859, 861 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that a young man belonging to a formal group protesting against MS-13 was not a member of a 
particular social group because he was not sufficiently socially visible). 
 56. See Cantillo-Charris v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 382 F. App’x 817, 819–20 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding 
that a dentist who operated a dental-prosthetics laboratory and received numerous threats from gang 
members promising consequences if he did not provide dental-prosthetics services who left his 
profession and began to sell bananas instead in order to escape from the gangs was not sufficiently 
socially visible). 
 57. See de Padilla v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 403 F. App’x 472, 473 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that a 
man with education and training desired by revolutionaries who refused to share his skills to 
revolutionaries was not a member of a particular social group because “countless persons could declare 
membership based on any occupational skill they possess that is desired by the revolutionaries.”). 
 58. Ling v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 404 F. App’x 426, 429 (11th Cir. 2010). Like noncriminal 
informants, business owners in debt to loan sharks are too “numerous and inchoate”; the court also 
found this particular-social-group formulation unacceptable because it was defined by persecution by 
the loan sharks. Id. The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its distaste for noncriminal informants in Pinzon 
Pulido v. U.S. Attorney General, where it found that a paid informant who worked against a Colombian 
cartel for several years engaged in “risks similar to those of the police or military” and thus could not be 
considered a member of a cognizable particular social group. Pinzon Pulido v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 427 
F. App’x 729, 730 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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membership in this Particular Social Group as a catchall when her 
persecution did not fit into one of the other four grounds.59 
Additionally, wearing a uniform specifically distinguishing oneself as 
a United States embassy security guard will not render an individual 
sufficiently socially visible for the Eleventh Circuit. In 2011, the 
court determined that the Haitian society would not perceive a former 
embassy guard as a member of a Particular Social Group because he 
did not prove that this group would “be generally recognized and 
perceived as a group in [his] community.”60 This narrow construction 
of Particular Social Groups continues today.61 In the summer of 
2018, then-Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions III issued a 
controversial opinion in Matter of A-B, overturning a previous BIA 
decision approving surviving domestic violence as a potential basis 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Solis v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 411 F. App’x 256, 257–58 (11th Cir. 2011). In declining the 
woman’s petition for review of the single-panel BIA decision, the Eleventh Circuit also offered as 
justification “that being misidentified by a newspaper as a murderer falls outside the category of shared 
experiences that Congress intended to protect.” Id. at 259. Although the woman’s son and husband were 
murdered in Guatemala after her misidentification, the Eleventh Circuit found that her failure to 
“present any evidence beyond her own assertion” that the misidentification spurred the murders 
dampened her motion to reopen her asylum application. Solis v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 463 F. App’x 859, 
862 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 60. Pierre v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 432 F. App’x 845, 848 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 61. In 2011, the Eleventh Circuit also upheld the BIA’s decision that a family targeted as part of a 
blood feud could not represent a cognizable Particular Social Group because the targeted family was not 
“sufficiently visible to Albanian society as a whole.” Perkeci v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 446 F. App’x 236, 
239 (11th Cir. 2011). Two years later, the Eleventh Circuit also found that a woman seeking asylum on 
the basis of her membership in the Particular Social Group of attractive women sexually harassed by 
government or police offers was not sufficiently socially visible. Udesh v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 518 F. 
App’x 921, 924 (11th Cir. 2013). In 2014, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a lower court’s determination that 
witnesses to a police murder in South Africa were, like noncriminal informants, insufficiently socially 
visible to belong to a Particular Social Group. Swart v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 552 F. App’x 922, 925 (11th 
Cir. 2014). The same year, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly defied Matter of Acosta by affirming that 
former military members who testified in successful investigations and prosecutions of illegal armed 
groups in Colombia were not socially visible because the criminal proceedings were private and, as with 
regular noncriminal informants, the court found no evidence that “the drug cartel would treat informants 
differently from any other person the cartel perceived to have interfered with its activities.” Granados v. 
U.S. Attorney Gen., 578 F. App’x 866, 871–72 (11th Cir. 2014). The court also noted that the danger 
cartels pose to the population at large diluted the court’s perception of danger to this witness 
specifically: “virtually the entire population is a potential subject of persecution by the cartel.” Id. In 
2015, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision not to recognize religious teachers who 
explicitly oppose gang membership and “deter other[s] from joining” gangs as socially visible by 
insisting that the Roman Catholic catechist at issue, who urged his constituents against joining the 
Maras, “had not distinguished his particular social group from people who oppose criminal 
organizations generally.” Balam-Ruiz v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 608 F. App’x 908, 909 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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for forming a Particular Social Group.62 Matter of A-B encourages 
immigration judges to take an even stricter posture toward Particular 
Social Groups, urging that “[g]enerally, claims by aliens pertaining to 
domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by nongovernmental 
actors will not qualify for asylum,” sparking fears among immigrant 
activists that judges would outright forbid Particular Social Groups 
involving gender or gang ties.63 Although the Eleventh Circuit has 
reviewed BIA decisions since Matter of A-B, it has not yet cited the 
decision as controlling authority. 
II.   Analysis 
The UNHCR itself, whose updated 2002 guidelines inspired the 
social-visibility requirement, has suggested that the BIA 
misinterpreted its guidance by adopting social visibility as an 
additional requirement to the Particular-Social-Group inquiry, stating 
in an amicus brief that “groups need not be easily recognizable to the 
general public” to be perceived as a Particular Social Group.64 
Instead, the UNHCR clarified that its guidelines “sought to 
reconcile” two different approaches to evaluating Particular Social 
Groups (“protected characteristics” and “social perception”) by 
                                                                                                                 
 62. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 316 (U.S. Attorney Gen. 2018) (interim decision), abrogated by 
Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018) (appeal filed D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 2019). 
 63. See id. at 320. 
 64. Brief of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae, 
Michelle Thomas et al., A75-597-033/-034/-035/-036, 6 (B.I.A. Jan. 25, 2007), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45c34c244.html [https://perma.cc/9T6Z-KTTF] [hereinafter Brief 
for Refugees as Amicus Curiae]. The UNHCR criticized the BIA’s imposition of social visibility as 
determinative to the Particular Social Group inquiry: 
DHS argues in its brief that the Board has adopted a new test in Matter of C-A-, 23 I & 
N Dec. 951 (BIA 2006) that adds an additional requirement to the “immutable or 
fundamental characteristic” approach to the particular social group analysis that was 
established in Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (1985). According to DHS, the 
additional requirement is that there must be “social perception” or “visibility” of the 
group. It is not clear to us that the Board meant to adopt such a requirement, 
particularly given that the Board in Matter of C-A- referenced the definition set forth 
in the UNHCR Guidelines on Membership of a Particular Social Group, which does 
not include a requirement that a particular social group meet the “social perception” 
test nor that the group be “socially visible.” 
Id. at 6. The UNHCR does caution against imposing too rigid a test, urging the Board against “adopting 
such a rigid approach which may disregard groups that the Convention is designed to protect.” Id. at 10. 
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endorsing a “single standard.” In its brief, the UNHCR emphasized 
that “a particular social group is a group of persons who share a 
common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or 
who are perceived as a group by society.”65 
Not only has the international organization that influences much of 
United States asylum law denounced imposition of the social-
visibility requirement but various United States circuit courts have 
criticized or declined to apply it.66 Even among the circuits courts 
that do apply the social-visibility requirement, like the Eleventh 
Circuit, the social-visibility criterion leads to drastically disparate 
outcomes.67 Certain types of cases—most notably gang-based and 
gender-based persecution claims—are disproportionately shuttered 
by the social-visibility requirement. Unlike claims based on readily 
apparent grounds like membership in an indigenous tribe, these 
claims based on personal convictions or stemming from past trauma 
can often be concealed. Both types of claims involve especially 
vulnerable people (for example, cartel informants and women 
opposed to forced marriages) who must by necessity remain invisible 
to escape further persecution. But by expending every effort to avoid 
standing out in society (for example, women pretending to support 
female genital mutilation to avoid being beaten for speaking out 
against community leaders), these vulnerable individuals, often 
persecuted due to factors more complex and localized than race, 
religion, nationality, or political opinion, can lose their eligibility to 
win asylum in the United States. In this way, the social-visibility 
requirement acts as a perverse incentive. Only by broadcasting their 
vulnerabilities to their oppressors can persecuted people hope to 
prove that they were sufficiently socially visible in their native 
countries to win asylum in the United States. 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. at 6. 
 66. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 603–04 (3d Cir. 2011); 
Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 67. Jason Dzubow, The Easiest Office to Win Asylum, and Why You Shouldn’t Apply There, 
ASYLUMIST (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.asylumist.com/2016/02/25/the-easiest-office-to-win-asylum-
and-why-you-shouldnt-apply-there/ [https://perma.cc/TX7U-RHSX]. 
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A.   The Third and Seventh Circuits Reject the Social-Visibility 
Requirement 
In 2009, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the other circuit courts’ 
adoption of the BIA’s social-visibility requirement but declined to 
apply it.68 In Gatimi v. Holder, the court held that “it makes no 
sense” to require a Kenyan defector from the Mungiki political group 
to show that “others in Kenyan society [would] recognize him as a 
former member of Mungiki.”69 Requiring vulnerable classes of 
individuals to be recognized by society is unrealistic because these 
targeted people “will take pains to avoid being socially visible.”70 
Thus, to the extent that “members of the targeted group are 
successful in remaining invisible, they will not be ‘seen’ by other 
people in society ‘as a segment of the population.’”71 The Seventh 
Circuit acknowledged the Supreme Court’s reminder that “the 
Board’s definition of ‘particular social group’ is entitled to 
deference”; however, the court maintained that the BIA 
“inconsistent[ly]” applied social visibility by recognizing cognizable 
Particular Social Groups “without reference to social visibility” while 
also refusing to classify “socially invisible groups as particular social 
groups . . . without repudiating the other line of cases.”72 
Two years later, the Third Circuit also rejected social visibility as 
inconsistent with the Acosta line of cases.73 The court pointed to 
various Particular Social Groups that were approved following 
Acosta—women “opposed to female genital mutilation,” 
“homosexuals required to register in Cuba,” and “former members of 
the El Salvador national police”—noting it was “hard-pressed to 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 616. The court had “no quarrel” with their sister court’s rejection of various 
proposed Particular Social Groups, but “just [didn’t] see what work ‘social visibility’ does” that 
improves upon the Matter of Acosta test. Id. 
 69. Id. at 615. 
 70. Id. (emphasis added). 
 71. Id. “Women who have not yet undergone female genital mutilation in tribes that practice it do 
not look different from anyone else. A homosexual in a homophobic society will pass as heterosexual.” 
Id. 
 72. Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615–16. 
 73. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 603–04 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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understand how the ‘social visibility’ requirement was satisfied” in 
these prior cases involving groups not particularly “recognizable by 
others in the country.”74 The court insisted that Chevron deference 
does not entitle the BIA to “generate erratic, irreconcilable 
interpretations of their governing statutes” and stated that it would 
assess “whether the agency’s current interpretation is ‘reasonable’” 
by evaluating the BIA’s “[c]onsistency over time and across 
subjects.”75 Because the Third Circuit considered social visibility 
“inconsistent with past BIA decisions,” it concluded that social 
visibility “is an unreasonable addition” to the components of a 
cognizable Particular Social Group.76 
B.   The Eleventh Circuit’s Application of Social Visibility 
The Eleventh Circuit—and Atlanta’s Immigration Court 
specifically—is one of the most difficult regions in which to win 
asylum.77 Out of 604 claims adjudicated by the Atlanta Immigration 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Id. at 604. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. In 2013, the Ninth Circuit responded to the Third Circuit, acknowledging that although “it is 
difficult to articulate precisely what the BIA meant by ‘social visibility,’” this requirement does not 
entail literal “on-sight visibility”; instead, the court interpreted social visibility to mean that a social 
group is “understood by others to constitute [a] social group[].” Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 
1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 2013). Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that the persecutors’ understanding of 
their victims was most dispositive in finding a group sufficiently visible: 
The petitioner is persecuted precisely because the persecutor recognizes the object of 
his persecution. Further, the petitioner’s awareness of her own group status is not a 
baseline requirement—for example, an infant may not be aware of race, sex, or 
religion. Society in general may also not be aware of a particular religious sect in a 
remote region. However, a group may be persecuted because of the persecutor’s 
perceptions of the existence of those groups. We do not mean to imply that an alien 
should be required in every case to prove that his persecutors perceived his social 
group to be socially visible. When there is evidence that a social group is visible to 
society, there is no need to prove that the petitioner’s persecutors perceived that group 
as visible. We mean only to suggest that evidence of perceptions in society as a whole 
is not the exclusive means of demonstrating social visibility. When a particular social 
group is not visible to society in general (as with a characteristic that is geographically 
limited, or that individuals may make efforts to hide), social visibility may be 
demonstrated by looking to the perceptions of persecutors. 
Id. at 1089–90 (internal citations omitted). 
 77. See OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & STATISTICS, supra note 13, at K2. 
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Court in 2016, only fourteen were granted.78 Compared to a national 
average grant rate of 43%, this 2% approval rate suggests that the 
Atlanta Immigration Court is applying the law significantly more 
harshly than its peers.79 Indeed, the vast disparities among national 
grant rates, which range from 0% to 85%, indicate that inconsistent 
interpretation of the law poses a serious problem across the United 
States.80 
Immigration judges, concerned about fraud, report denying asylum 
applications because they were “copied word-for-word” from other 
applicants’ applications.81 But legal observers, lacking evidence that 
the rate of fraud among asylum seekers is higher in Georgia than 
other states, suggest that contempt or apathy toward asylum seekers 
may help to explain the Atlanta Immigration Court’s low asylum 
approval rate.82 When students from Emory Law School observed 
proceedings at the Atlanta Immigration Court, they were told by one 
judge that his applicants were “trying to scam the system.”83 Another 
judge regularly “closed his eyes during hearings” and leaned back 
with his head in his hands in an apparent expression of disinterest, 
and a third spoke to a Portuguese-speaking applicant who did not 
understand English without an interpreter, outside the presence of his 
attorney, before setting a $25,000 bond.84 This report supports the 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. In addition to disparate applications of the law, swells of different types of cases reaching 
different immigration courts contribute to these inconsistent grant rates. Dzubow, supra note 67. Some 
immigration courts, like Houston, are likelier, due to proximity, to receive Central American asylum 
applicants fleeing gang persecution, who are less likely to neatly fit into one of the prescribed grounds 
for asylum. Id. Larger numbers of these disfavored cases may lead to lower grant rates in the southern 
United States. Id. 
 81.  Jeremy Redmon, Winning Asylum Is Tough in Georgia’s Immigration Courts, ATLANTA J.-
CONST. (Apr. 18, 2014), https://www.ajc.com/news/national-govt—politics/winning-asylum-tough-
georgia-immigration-courts/lQpQfNsmOALlIX8sB2HXXP [https://perma.cc/Q753-83PK]. 
 82. Letter from Hallie Ludsin, supra note 23. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. In 2018, the median U.S. immigration bond was approximately $7,500. Three-fold Difference 
in Immigration Bond Amounts by Court Location, TRAC IMMIGRATION, 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/519 (last visited Jan. 8, 2019). In most Atlanta immigration court 
cases, the students observed “[i]mmigration [j]udges den[ying] bond to immigrant detainees[] or 
set[ting] bonds at a prohibitively high amount.” Letter from Hallie Ludsin, supra note 23. 
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idea that Atlanta’s remarkably low asylum grant rates result in part 
from insufficient attention and resources for asylum seekers’ due 
process rights. 
According to the Georgia Commission on Interpreters, courts must 
“provide access to competent professional interpreters to ensure 
understanding and participation for all non-English speaking 
persons” facing the court.85 The Atlanta Immigration Court’s casual 
approach to in-court interpretation suggests, at best, a cursory 
commitment to ensuring immigrants’ due process rights. At worst, 
the Atlanta Immigration Court’s documented behavior toward 
immigrants reveals contempt toward asylum seekers that is 
seemingly unmatched by other immigration courts. The Eleventh 
Circuit’s reluctance to overturn, or even challenge, the lower courts’ 
continued application of social visibility represents a missed 
opportunity to remind the Atlanta Immigration Court of its due 
process and humanitarian obligations to asylum seekers. 
1.   The Eleventh Circuit’s Application of Social Visibility to 
Claims Based on Gang   Opposition 
Beginning with Castillo-Arias, the Eleventh Circuit has used the 
social-visibility requirement to justify the lower courts’ growing 
distaste for gang-based asylum claims.86 These claims are 
particularly vulnerable to the harsh social-visibility requirement 
because people persecuted by gangs typically try their best not to be 
recognizable as gang targets.87 Central America’s Northern Triangle 
(El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) contains some of the most 
violent countries in the world.88 Gangs in these countries have 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Georgia Commission on Interpreters, JUD. COUNCIL GA., http://coi.georgiacourts.gov/ 
[https://perma.cc/PLW4-VQLE] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 86. Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1194 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 87. See U.S. DEP’T STATE, EL SALVADOR 2016 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 13 (updated 2017). 
 88. Danielle Renwick, Central America’s Violent Northern Triangle, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/central-americas-violent-northern-triangle [https://perma.cc/Q753-
83PK] (last updated Jan. 19, 2016). El Salvador in particular is the “world’s most violent country not at 
war.” Id. Of thirty million residents, “nearly 10[%]” of people from countries in the Northern Triangle 
have left, “mostly for the United States.” Id. 
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assumed significant control; according to the most recent Human 
Rights Report for El Salvador: 
Each gang had its own controlled territory. Gang members 
did not allow persons living in another gang’s controlled 
area to enter their territory, even when travelling in public 
transportation. Gangs forced persons to present 
identification cards (that contain their addresses) to 
determine where they lived. If gang members discovered 
that a person lived in a rival gang’s territory, that person 
might be killed, beaten, or not allowed to enter the territory. 
Bus companies paid extortion fees to operate within gang 
territories, often paying numerous fees for the different 
areas in which they operated. The extortion costs were 
passed on to paying customers.89 
Because gangs have amassed the power to restrict movement to the 
point where people who live in rival gangs’ territories are killed 
simply for entering certain areas, gang victims are understandably 
reluctant to identify themselves as targets.90 Just as a gay man in 
Brazil might do everything in his power to avoid presenting as gay 
because he is significantly more likely to be killed for his sexuality in 
Brazil than in the United States, people in Central America who 
oppose gangs must necessarily avoid making their opinions publicly 
known.91 Legal critics argue that the Eleventh Circuit’s continued 
application of the social-visibility requirement makes winning 
asylum nearly impossible for victims of gang persecution because 
people in societies overridden by gangs must hide their opposition to 
gangs to survive.92 
                                                                                                                 
 89. U.S. DEP’T STATE, supra note 87, at 16. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Vinicius de Vita, An LGBT Person is Murdered Every 28 Hours in Brazil, HUFFINGTON POST 
(July 11, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/vinacius-de-vita/one-lgbt-killed-every-28-
_b_10927070.html [https://perma.cc/JH9F-EUZ6]. 
 92. See U.S. DEP’T STATE, supra note 87, at 16. 
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2.   Applicability to Gender-Based Claims 
Just as those who oppose or work against gangs are not typically 
“visible” to society at large, minorities who suffer from gender-based 
persecution are frequently invisible (or encouraged to remain 
invisible) within their societies.93 According to the most recent 
Human Rights Report from El Salvador: 
NGOs reported that public officials, including police, 
engaged in violence and discrimination against sexual 
minorities. Persons from the LGBTI community stated that 
the agencies in charge of processing identification 
documents, the PNC, and the Attorney General’s Office 
harassed transgender and gay individuals when they 
applied for identification cards or reported cases of 
violence against LGBTI persons. The LGBTI community 
reported authorities harassed LGBTI persons by conducting 
strip searches and questioning their gender in a degrading 
manner. The government responded to these abuses 
primarily through PDDH reports that publicized specific 
cases of violence and discrimination against sexual 
minorities.94 
Further, “a large portion of the population” in South America 
considers domestic violence “socially acceptable”; just as with rape, 
domestic violence is not widely reported.95 This instinct to normalize 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. The report further details that in 2016: 
Laws against domestic violence were not well enforced, and cases were not effectively 
prosecuted. The law prohibits mediation in domestic violence disputes. Between 
January and July 2016, ISDEMU reported 21 cases of femicide, 458 cases of physical 
abuse, 385 cases of sexual violence, and 2,259 cases of psychological abuse. ISDEMU 
reported 3,070 cases of domestic violence against women during the same period. In 
June ISDEMU issued its 2015 annual report on violence against women and reported 
that 230 died due to violence in the first six months of 2015, compared with 294 
during the same period in 2014 and 217 in 2013. 
Id. 
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gender and sexuality-based violence in countries where this violence 
is rampant renders its victims invisible.96 
Even when an applicant fought publicly against an oppressively 
silent society, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the social-visibility 
requirement to affirm the lower court’s asylum denial.97 In Fejza v. 
U.S. Attorney General, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied 
asylum to a woman who, as a fifteen-year-old, was designated for an 
arranged marriage with a thirty-year-old man. When she refused to 
marry him, her father beat her badly.98 Two years later, she fled to 
another village and married her boyfriend, which prompted death 
threats from her own family and from her previous fiancé and his 
family.99 While she and her husband stood at a bus stop, the 
applicant’s former fiancé fired gunshots at her and her husband.100 
After receiving continued threats over several years from her former 
fiancé and his family, the applicant fled to the United States with her 
daughter.101 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the BIA’s decision that 
“women in Albania who refuse their families’ arranged marriages” 
do not belong to a cognizable Particular Social Group because “the 
record did not indicate that the members of this group are a distinct 
and recognizable group in Albanian society.”102 However, the 
applicant was apparently recognizable enough to her persecutors—
even after disowning her family and fleeing to a different village, two 
different families managed to find her and threaten her for years until 
she left the country.103 The BIA suggested that her Particular Social 
Group failed because it was “not defined by an economic, cultural, or 
ethnic grouping . . . or other characteristics that define[d] the group in 
other than in an amorphous fashion.”104 Aside from formally creating 
                                                                                                                 
 96. See id. 
 97. Fejza v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 489 F. App’x 326, 329–30 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 98. Id. at 327–28. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 329–30. 
 103. Fejza v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 489 F. App’x 326, 328 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 104. Id. at 330. 
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a group to demonstrate her opposition to the longstanding cultural 
institution of arranged marriage and to patriarchal attitudes in 
Albanian society, it is unclear what more the applicant could have 
done to become socially visible.105 
III.   Proposal 
In 2011, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered the 
possibility of rejecting the social-visibility requirement, 
acknowledging an asylum seeker’s argument that social visibility is 
“arbitrary, inconsistent, and contrary to the law.”106 Somewhat 
reluctantly, the court ultimately decided it was “bound” to apply 
social visibility because the requirement had not been struck down by 
the Supreme Court or by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals en 
banc.107 Here, five years after Castillo-Arias, the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals explicitly considered criticism of the social-
visibility requirement and demonstrated a potential willingness to 
reconsider the requirement in the future.108 In 2019, the Eleventh 
Circuit, which unlike several other circuit courts has not yet 
discussed Matter of A-B, has the opportunity to reject lower courts’ 
overt hostility toward those seeking asylum based on persecution 
stemming from gender or gang violence. 
The Eleventh Circuit should revisit its position in Pierre v. U.S. 
Attorney General in light of the UNHCR’s clarification and criticism 
of the BIA’s social-visibility requirement, imposed after 
                                                                                                                 
 105. See Albania: Forced Marriages of Women, Including Those Who Are Already Married; State 
Protection and Resources Provided to Women Who Try to Avoid a Marriage Imposed on Them, 
IMMIGR. & REFUGEE BOARD CAN. (Aug. 13, 2015), 
https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/311896/436061_en.html [https://perma.cc/7SL6-8ECF]. 
Nongovernmental organizations report that “forced marriages occur frequently, especially in rural areas 
and informal settlements; however, ‘real figures do not exist’ regarding the incidence [sic] forced 
marriage . . . .” Id. Although “society in general does not approve [of] forced marriages,” they are a 
“well[-]known phenomenon in the country, especially in rural remote areas” where “patriarchal 
menalit[ies]” are more prevalent. Id. 
 106. Pierre v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 432 F. App’x 845, 847 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 107. Id. at 848. 
 108. Id. 
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misinterpreting UNHCR guidance.109 By rejecting this requirement 
and adopting a more nuanced test for Particular Social Groups, the 
Eleventh Circuit would encourage immigration courts with wildly 
disparate outcomes to again reach decisions consistent with the 
international agreements that formed the basis for United States 
asylum law and with the original Matter of Acosta line of asylum 
decisions. 
A.   The Eleventh Circuit Should Adopt the UNHCR’s Clarified 
Guidance Suggesting Social Visibility as an Alternative Basis for 
Forming a Particular Social Group 
Although the UNHCR’s guidelines are not binding on United 
States asylum law, as previously discussed, the UNHCR is the 
“guardian” of the 1951 Convention—the source of United States 
asylum law; moreover, the BIA relied on its interpretation of the 
UNHCR’s 2002 guidance to impose the social-visibility 
requirement.110 The UNHCR called for a reconciliation of the 
“immutability” and “social perception approaches” with a single 
standard for Particular Social Groups: “persons who share a common 
characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are 
perceived as a group by society.”111 The BIA then described visibility 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Brief for Refugees as Amicus Curiae, supra note 64, at 6. 
 110. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 956–57 (B.I.A. 2006); Guidelines on International Protection, supra 
note 49, at 1; THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 
PROTOCOL, supra note 28, at 6. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) characterized the UNHCR’s 
guidelines as “combin[ing] elements of the Acosta immutable or fundamental characteristic approach, as 
well as the Second Circuit’s ‘social perception’ approach.” C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 956–57 (B.I.A. 
2006). The BIA also interpreted the guidelines to “confirm that ‘visibility’ is an important element in 
identifying the existence of a particular social group.” Id. at 960. Those guidelines, “intended to provide 
legal interpretative guidance for governments, legal practitioners, decision-makers, and the judiciary,” in 
part urged that “particular social group should be read in an evolutionary manner, open to the diverse 
and changing nature of groups in various societies and evolving international human rights norms.” 
Guidelines on International Protection, supra note 49, at ¶ 3. 
 111. Guidelines on International Protection, supra note 49, at ¶ 6 (emphasis added). UNHCR added: 
This definition includes characteristics which are historical and therefore cannot be 
changed, and those which, though it is possible to change them, ought not to be 
required to be changed because they are so closely linked to the identity of the person 
or are an expression of fundamental human rights. It follows that sex can properly be 
within the ambit of the social group category, with women being a clear example of a 
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as an “important element in identifying the existence of a particular 
social group.”112 
Given the UNHCR’s integral role in originating and contributing 
to the evolution of United States asylum law, the Eleventh Circuit 
should recognize the UNHCR’s caution against the BIA’s 
overreliance on social visibility by following the UNHCR’s 
Particular Social Group definition: “persons who share a common 
characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are 
perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will often be one 
which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to 
identity, conscience, or the exercise of one’s human rights.”113 The 
Eleventh Circuit should correct the BIA’s misinterpretation of the 
UNHCR’s “alternate approaches” as “dual requirements” and thus 
restore the circuit’s consistency with the Matter of Acosta line of 
cases.114 In light of the “overwhelming constitutional concerns”115 
associated with returning an asylum seeker to a country that he 
believes will torture or kill him, the Eleventh Circuit should retreat 
from its current level of deference to the BIA and adopt the 
UNHCR’s clarified guidance to standardize lower courts’ 
inconsistent asylum grant rates and correct for biases against asylum 
seekers in immigration courts like Atlanta with outlying denial rates. 
This rule adds social visibility as an alternative to Matter of 
Acosta’s immutable-characteristic test, helping adjudicators “identify 
and discern social groups that exist in a particular society, without 
opening up . . . ground” for Particular Social Groups “to become a 
‘catch all’ classification” for claims that simply do not merit asylum 
                                                                                                                 
social subset defined by innate and immutable characteristics, and who are frequently 
treated differently to men. 
Id. at ¶ 12. 
 112. C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 960 (B.I.A. 2006). 
 113. Guidelines on International Protection, supra note 49, at ¶ 11. The UNHCR also notes that “the 
Board in Acosta did not require either a ‘social perception’ or ‘social visibility’ test, and [we] would 
caution the Board against adopting such a rigid approach which may disregard groups that the 
Convention is designed to protect.” Brief for Refugees as Amicus Curiae, supra note 64, at 10. 
 114. Brief for Refugees as Amicus Curiae, supra note 64, at 5. 
 115. Matthew F. Soares, Agencies and Aliens: A Modified Approach to Chevron Deference in 
Immigration Cases, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 925, 933 (2014). 
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relief.116 For example, this test would not allow a proposed group that 
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals previously rejected (“attractive 
women sexually harassed by government or police officers”)117 to 
amount to a cognizable Particular Social Group. Attractiveness is not 
a characteristic “so fundamental to individual identity or conscience” 
that it can be considered immutable.118 This asylum claim, which was 
previously rejected by the Eleventh Circuit, would still fail under the 
more reasonable alternatives test. The addition of immutability as an 
alternative basis to social visibility for forming a Particular Social 
Group will not open the floodgates to undeserving “catch[]all” cases; 
instead, it will produce outcomes in the same spirit as Matter of 
Acosta and reduce the wide variances in asylum adjudications 
between judges.119 
1.   Effects on Gender-Based Particular Social Groups 
Reintroducing immutability as an alternative to social visibility 
will lead to fairer outcomes for gender-based Particular Social 
Groups. Gender, which is excluded from the primary four bases for 
asylum (race, religion, nationality, and political opinion), is a target 
for numerous forms of persecution.120 Immigration courts currently 
fail to “respond to the urgent needs” of women subjected to 
persecution in their countries of origin.121 The primary cause of this 
failure is the stringent application of social visibility to claims of 
persecution based on gender. Women who oppose female genital 
mutilation, women who oppose arranged marriages, and transgender 
women, for example, must by necessity remain invisible in 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Brief for Refugees as Amicus Curiae, supra note 64, at 9–10. 
 117. Udesh v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 518 F. App’x 921, 924 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 118. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. 
Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). 
 119. See id.; Brief for Refugees as Amicus Curiae, supra note 64, at 5. 
 120. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2018). The UNHCR acknowledged that asylum has been approached 
through “male experiences,” meaning that “many claims of women and of homosexuals[] have gone 
unrecognised [sic].” UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution 
Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002). 
 121. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101(a), 94 Stat. 102, 102 (1980). 
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oppressive societies. Returning to women the ability to present an 
immutable characteristic as the basis for a Particular Social Group 
rather than requiring women to lay bare their vulnerabilities in public 
would represent a “logical and disciplined application of the law” 
that takes a “middle-ground approach” to recognize gender-based 
groups.122 The immutable-characteristic test “acknowledge[es] that 
the Particular Social Group category was meant to expand relief” 
beyond race, religion, nationality, and political opinion but not to the 
point that the test becomes “inconsequential.”123 
Under the “alternatives” framework proposed by UNHCR, Fejza v. 
U.S. Attorney General would have a more reasonable outcome. No 
longer constrained by social visibility, the court would be free to find 
that the asylum seeker’s opposition to and defiance of forced 
marriage amounted to an immutable characteristic because her 
resistance to societal norms is fundamental to her identity, 
conscience, and exercise of her human rights.124 Thus, under this 
alternative framework, women opposed to forced marriages could 
escape their predicaments without having to prove that they were 
perceived in society as cultural opposition. By removing the perverse 
incentive for vulnerable individuals to project their opposition to 
government or cultural forces of persecution to society at large, the 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Jesse Imbriano, Note, Opening the Floodgates or Filling the Gap?: Perdomo v. Holder Advances 
the Ninth Circuit One Step Closer to Recognizing Gender-Based Asylum Claims, 56 VILL. L. REV. 327, 
344 (2011). 
 123. Id. To those who would argue that this treatment of gender-based claims would “open the 
floodgates,” Imbriano responds: 
Emphasis on the size of the social group is misplaced. Appropriate interpretation of 
the refugee definition does not require that a particular social group be a small 
category but actually suggests that it is a very large category parallel to race, religion, 
and nationality. Additionally, concern for the size of the group ignores the importance 
of other requirements for protection under asylum law. Recognition of a gender-based 
particular social group does not grant blanket asylum to all women in the cited 
country. Female victims of random criminal activity, for example, would not be 
eligible for asylum. If an immigration judge finds that a female asylum applicant was 
victimized through an individualized attack, unrelated to her identity as a woman, the 
judge will not approve her claim for asylum. 
Id. at 350–51. 
 124. Fejza v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 489 F. App’x 326, 329 (11th Cir. 2012); Guidelines on 
International Protection, supra note 49, at ¶ 11. 
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Eleventh Circuit can help restore reasoned compassion to the asylum 
process in the southeastern United States. 
2.   Effects on Gang-Based Particular Social Groups 
Likewise, allowing immutability as an alternative to social 
visibility will result in fairer adjudications of gang-based asylum 
claims in southeastern immigration courts. People like Heidy, who 
expressly oppose gang practices through words or action, would have 
the opportunity to prove that their anti-gang positions are 
characteristics fundamental to their identity or conscience.125 Under 
this framework, the success of Heidy’s claim would not hinge upon 
showing that gang members limited their persecution to students like 
Heidy and that people like her opposed to the gangs were 
“generally . . . recognizable by others in the community.”126 The fact 
that gangs target many groups of people should not preclude their 
lower profile opposition from winning safety from persecution. 
The Eleventh Circuit is hesitant to exercise its discretion favorably 
toward gang-based asylum claims. Indeed, these claims are 
unpopular—some in the judiciary view being targeted by gangs as a 
poor reflection on asylum seekers’ own characters, or at best, a 
nonactionable instance of a country “hav[ing] problems effectively 
policing certain crimes.”127 This current approach only punishes 
those courageous enough to defy the gangs. The Eleventh Circuit 
should encourage opposition to gangs among asylum seekers by 
applying the UNHCR’s framework and by welcoming “individuals 
who have rejected the gangster lifestyle and have been persecuted 
and harmed as a result of that rejection.”128 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Vasquez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 345 F. App’x 441, 445 (11th Cir. 2009); Guidelines on 
International Protection, supra note 49, at ¶ 11. 
 126. Vasquez, 345 F. App’x at 446. 
 127. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 316 (U.S. Attorney Gen. 2018) (interim decision) , abrogated by 
Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018) (appeal filed D.C. Cir. Jan. 30, 2019); see 
Cantillo-Charris v. U.S. Attorney. Gen., 382 F. App’x 817, 819–20 (11th Cir. 2010); Navas-Villanueva 
v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 338 F. App’x 859, 861 (11th Cir. 2009); Gomez-Benitez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 
295 F. App’x 324, 326 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 128. Lorena S. Rivas-Tiemann, Asylum to a Particular Social Group: New Developments and Its 
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Adopting immutability as an alternative to social visibility would 
realign decisions with Matter of Acosta. For example, former military 
members who testified against illegal armed groups in Colombia who 
are not sufficiently socially visible because they testified in “private” 
criminal proceedings129 would no longer be barred from asylum. 
These applicants could again rely upon the immutable fact of their 
military service and recorded opposition to gangs when applying for 
asylum. By allowing those opposed to gangs to gain asylum through 
an immutable characteristic rather than recognition by society (for 
example, young men who protested MS-13 but, despite belonging to 
a formal group, were not recognized by society as MS-13’s 
opposition),130 the Eleventh Circuit would restore consistency to the 
Particular Social Group analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
By continuing to accept lower courts’ strict application of social 
visibility as a requirement for cognizable Particular Social Groups, 
the Eleventh Circuit excludes meritorious asylum claims and 
condones troubling behavior toward asylum seekers. The current 
application of the social-visibility requirement punishes vulnerable 
groups for hiding their vulnerabilities within hostile societies. To 
                                                                                                                 
Future for Gang-Violence Victims, 47 TULSA L. REV. 477, 501 (2011). Rivas-Tiemann recognizes the 
value of the immutability test for gender and gang-based particular social groups: 
On the other hand, both groups of gender violence and gang violence victims have a 
greater opportunity to pass the Acosta test. The characteristics of having intact 
genitalia, being involved with a male companion who practiced male domination 
through violence, and refusing to join a gang are all common characteristics that 
cannot be changed or should not be made to change. Additionally, the youth 
characteristic that many gang violence victims use also meets the Acosta test because a 
person cannot change their age. Therefore, the particular social groups consisting of 
gang violence victims would meet the Acosta test and be able to proceed to the rest of 
the asylum analysis. Since the social visibility test has not been used for victims of 
FGM and domestic violence, it should similarly be rejected and not used for victims of 
gang violence. 
Id. at 499. 
 129. Granados v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 578 F. App’x 866, 871–72 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 130. Navas-Villanueva, 338 F. App’x at 861. 
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reach decisions consistent with the United States’s original asylum 
law, the Eleventh Circuit should adopt the immutability-and-social-
visibility-alternatives test proposed by the UNHCR. This adoption 
would correct the lower courts’ misapplication of UNHCR guidance 
and provide fairer remedies for vulnerable but less visible groups 
seeking refuge from persecution. Even more critically, adopting the 
UNHCR’s test would send an important message to immigration 
courts like Atlanta’s with outlying denial rates: the social-visibility 
requirement will no longer shield apathy and inconsistency. 
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